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Estimating the Noise in the U.S. News
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This study investigates the quality of the U.S. News annual ranking of national univer-
sities and liberal arts colleges. The main finding is that current rankings changes
have a strong tendency to revert over the following two rankings. Using a simple
model, this study estimates that about 70 to 80 percent of the variation in rankings
changes is transitory and reversible. Thus, most of the “news” in the annual rankings
is essentially meaningless noise. An analysis of possible explanations suggests that
the noise in annual ranking changes is most likely due to various measurement,
estimation, and other information processing errors in the rankings’ underlying com-
ponents.
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INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the quality of the U.S. News and World Report (here-
after USN) annual ranking of U.S. colleges and universities. Although there are
other ranking sources (e.g., the Money magazine ranking of best buys in college
education), USN publishes by far the most important college rankings. The USN
ranking has the longest history and is generally regarded as the most authorita-
tive and least problematic of all college rankings (Webster, 1992). Additionally,
it is the most commercially successful. USN estimates that it sells over 2.2
million copies of the college rankings issue, reaching an end audience of 11
million people, and an additional 1 million copies of the related college guide-
book. Taken together, the USN ranking publications account for nearly half of
the total market of 6.7 million copies of newsmagazine college rankings and
guides (McDonough, Antonio, Walpole, and Perez, 1998). The success of the
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college rankings has prompted a substantial increase in the breadth and the depth
of the USN coverage. Today, USN produces rankings for a variety of institutions
of higher education, including national and regional universities and liberal arts
colleges, specialty schools, and graduate and professional schools.
The influence and the importance of the rankings have also gradually grown
for users of the rankings. Perhaps the most important reason for the success of
the rankings is users’ demand for objective and reliable information about col-
lege quality. College quality is not directly observable, and traditional college
catalogues and viewbooks are often uninformative and self-serving. Thus, faced
with the large cost of college education, applicants and their parents have been
increasingly looking for independent verification of quality (Webster, 1992).
Each year about 400,000 prospective students consider the rankings an impor-
tant factor in deciding which school to attend (McDonough et al., 1998). In
addition, McDonough and associates show that prospective students who use
the rankings tend to have higher high school grades and in general are more
sophisticated and better prepared for college. Thus, from the universities’ per-
spective, college rankings influence more heavily the most desirable college
applicants. Another sign of the importance of the rankings is that changes in the
rankings cause perceptible ebbs and flows in the number and quality of appli-
cants (e.g., Fombrun, 1996). As a result, albeit grudgingly, most top university
administrations have accepted the importance of the rankings, and many have
even attempted to manipulate their rankings. For example, schools have manipu-
lated their admission policies and the reporting of their average SAT scores to
affect the rankings (Hunter, 1995).
Despite the importance of college rankings, very little is actually known about
the properties and the quality of these rankings. Existing sources (e.g., Webster,
1992) mainly argue whether USN uses “good” inputs into the rankings (e.g.,
SAT scores vs. high school grades), and what is the “best” way to combine the
inputs to produce the rankings (e.g., how much weight to assign to each input).
These issues are undoubtedly important but there are disagreements about what
“best” should be, and it is difficult to address these issues directly in a rigorous
manner. Instead, the present study uses a different approach. It takes the existing
rankings as given and investigates their properties for quantitative evidence
about their quality.
More specifically, this study investigates the predictability of rankings
changes. One motivation is that finding little or no predictability in changes
essentially means that current rankings are unbiased forecasts of future rankings.
Forecasting ability is likely an important consideration for college applicants
because, while they choose a college based on current rankings, what they really
care about is the college rankings at graduation and beyond, when they will
affect the value of their human capital. Since college applicants are the most
important users of the rankings, it seems useful to investigate the predictability
239NOISE IN THE U.S. NEWS UNIVERSITY RANKINGS
of rankings changes. A related motivation is that if current rankings summarize
all relevant information efficiently, then changes should be triggered only by
new information. Since new information is by definition unpredictable, “good”
rankings should have little or no predictability in changes.
In any case, finding predictabilities in rankings changes can yield important
insights into the rankings. For example, it is possible that current rankings are
poor forecasts of future rankings but are a good measure of contemporaneous
real performance—much like a bestseller ranking is often a poor predictor of
future sales but accurately captures contemporaneous performance. To further
illustrate the implications of potential predictabilities in changes, assume that
rankings capture contemporaneous performance and that one finds a positive
autocorrelation in rankings changes. This evidence could be indicative of feed-
back effects in real performance, where an improvement in the rankings trans-
lates into better applicants, and better applicants in turn lead to a further im-
provement in the rankings.
The empirical evidence is based on an investigation of time-series predictabil-
ity in changes for the two most important rankings, USN’s Top 25 rankings of
national universities and national liberal arts colleges. The main finding is that
changes in the USN rankings have a strong tendency to revert in the next two
rankings. The reversibility in rankings is strong not only in statistical terms but
seems to account for a strikingly large part of the total variation in rankings
changes. Using a simple model of two-period reversibility, it appears that be-
tween 70 to 80 percent of the variation in rankings changes is due to “noise,”
to transitory effects, which quickly disappear in later rankings. Thus, most of
the “news” in USN’s annual college rankings is essentially meaningless noise.
The study also identifies and evaluates three possible sources of reversibilities
in the rankings changes: reversibilities in methodology, “fight-back” effects in
real performance, and that USN rankings are essentially mechanical aggrega-
tions of noisy and reversible components. A consideration of published ranking
methodologies reveals that methodology reversals are unlikely to account for
the quick reversals in the rankings. Changes in methodology are mostly gradual,
fairly small, and do not show obvious signs of reversals. Thus, if anything,
changes in methodology likely cause nonreversible changes in the rankings.
The observation that changes in the methodology likely cause nonreversible
changes in the rankings is interesting because it has two important implications.
First, if 70 to 80 percent of the rankings changes are reversible, and methodol-
ogy-induced changes account for a material portion of the nonreversible
changes, then it follows that real changes in fundamental school quality (which
are nonreversible) account for possibly as little as 10 percent of the variation in
published rankings changes. Second, critics of the USN rankings often point to
methodology-induced changes as a major problem in interpreting and comparing
the rankings (e.g., Webster, 1992; Karl, 1999). However, the quantitative esti-
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mates above suggest that in interpreting the rankings, predictable reversibilities
in changes pose an even bigger problem than methodology-induced changes.
“Fight-back” effects in real performance are also unlikely to account for the
large and quick reversibility in rankings changes. If schools that experience a
deterioration in the rankings fight back extra hard to regain their status, then
one would expect that fight-back effects would be especially pronounced for
intermediate to long-term changes in the rankings. However, additional evidence
reveals little or no reversibility in 5-year changes in the rankings. This evidence
is the opposite of what one might expect if fight-back effects in real performance
were to account for the reversibilities in the rankings.
The third possible explanation for the reversibilities in annual rankings
changes is based on the observation that published USN rankings are essentially
simple mechanical aggregations of noisy underlying components. Thus, the
rankings mechanically incorporate the noise in the underlying components.
Since the noise in the underlying components predictably reverses in the future,
the aggregated rankings also exhibit large and quick reversals in changes. This
explanation is supported by additional evidence that, unlike with methodology,
ranking components exhibit the same large and quick reversals in changes. The
statistical evidence is complemented by considering specific cases where evi-
dently large reversals in ranking components produce large reversals in the over-
all rankings.
The evidence in this study has implications for both preparers and users of
the rankings. It seems that, unless happy with producing meaningless “news,”
USN should employ some sort of explicit statistical analysis and filtering of the
noise in the rankings components. Such procedures would result in a substantial
reduction of the present variability of annual rankings changes. Rankings users
themselves can also correct the deficiencies of USN’s ranking methodology. If
USN continues its current practices, users should discount heavily the revisions
in the annual rankings updates, and look to long-term rankings and trends for
more reliable evidence on relative school quality.
INVESTIGATING THE PREDICTABILITY OF RANKINGS CHANGES
Searching for predictability in rankings changes necessarily involves specify-
ing a model of possible predictabilities in changes. A logical place to start is
the investigation of time-series predictability, that is, whether one can use past
changes in the rankings to explain and predict current changes in the rankings.
I use regression analysis to identify time-series patterns in predictability in rank-
ings.
An investigation of the rankings data and preliminary analyses showed that it
is useful to present more explicit evidence about the nature and the characteris-
tics of the rankings data. This preliminary evidence illustrates the logic behind
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the test design and helps in the interpretation of the results. Table 1 presents the
sample of USN Top 25 rankings of national universities and national liberal arts
colleges for 1987 to 1998. USN produces a variety of college rankings, including
Top 25 for national universities and national liberal arts colleges, second-, third-,
and fourth-tier rankings for national-level schools, and rankings of regional
schools and graduate and professional schools. However, to keep the analysis
tractable, I focus on the two most important rankings—the Top 25 for national
universities and national liberal arts colleges. Additionally, these two rankings
are the oldest and most complete, which allows for the following fairly extensive
statistical analyses.
USN issued the first rankings of national universities and liberal arts colleges
in 1983, issued new releases in 1985 and 1987; the rankings have become an
annual event since 1987. The 1988 ranking reflected a pronounced shift in meth-
odology. The rankings before 1988 were based exclusively on surveys of college
reputation. The rankings after 1988 are derived as summary measures from sev-
eral underlying components, which reflect both surveys and objective measures
like entering students’ exam scores, graduation rates, and so on. Thus, the large
shift in methodology from 1987 to 1988 caused a large and somewhat anoma-
lous shift in the rankings for many schools. For example, Panel A in Table 1
shows that the California Institute of Technology was ranked 21 in 1987, 3 in
1988, and it was never ranked below 9 thereafter. The University of California
at Berkeley was ranked 5 in 1987, 24 in 1988, and it was never ranked above
13 later. Similar large and mostly sustained drops occurred for the University
of Michigan and the University of North Carolina. An examination of Panel B
demonstrates similar large and anomalous shifts in the rankings between 1987
and 1988 for national liberal arts colleges. The rankings methodology has con-
tinued to evolve over the remaining years, but the changes have been compara-
tively small and incremental. An inspection of the rankings also does not reveal
such numerous and drastic changes in the rankings for later years. Thus, to
avoid the effects of regime shifts and nonhomogeneity, I restrict the test sample
to observations from years 1988 to 1998.
An examination of the raw data in Table 1 also helps to develop a qualitative
feel for the data, which is useful in interpreting the statistical results later. One
striking feature that emerges from this examination is that the composition of
the Top 25 schools is remarkably stable over time. For example, Panel A reveals
that there are only 29 schools that have been ranked at least once in the top 25
over the 11 years spanning 1988 to 1998. Twenty schools have always been in
the Top 25 schools, while schools that appear in and out of the rankings tend
to be confined mostly to the lower tiers of the Top 25 ordering. Apparently, it
is quite difficult for new entrants to break into this elite group of schools, and
it is uncommon for current Top 25 members to leave (especially for schools







TABLE 1. The USN Top 25 Rankings for National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges for 1987 to 1998
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Panel A: National Universities
Brown University 10 13 15 12 17 18 12 11 9 8 9 10
California Institute of Tech. 21 3 4 5 5 5 5 7 7 9 9 9
Carnegie Mellon University — — — 22 24 19 24 24 23 — 23 25
College of William and Mary 22 — — — — — — — — — — —
Columbia University, NY 18 8 11 10 9 10 11 9 15 11 9 10
Cornell University, NY 11 14 11 9 12 11 10 15 13 14 14 6
Dartmouth College, NH 6 7 8 8 8 7 8 8 7 7 7 10
Duke University, NC 7 12 5 7 7 8 7 6 6 4 3 6
Emory University 25 22 — — — 21 25 16 17 19 9 16
Georgetown University — 17 25 19 19 17 17 25 21 23 21 20
Harvard University 2 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
Johns Hopkins University 16 11 14 15 11 15 15 22 10 15 14 14
MIT, MA 11 5 7 6 6 5 4 4 5 5 6 4
Northwestern University, IL 17 16 19 23 14 13 13 14 13 9 9 10
Princeton 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Rice University 14 9 10 16 15 12 14 12 16 16 17 18
Stanford University, CA 1 6 6 2 3 4 6 5 4 6 5 4
Tufts University — — — — — — — — 25 22 23 25
UC–Berkeley 5 24 13 13 16 16 19 23 — — 23 22
UCLA — 21 16 17 23 23 22 — — — — 25
University of Chicago 8 10 9 11 10 9 9 10 11 12 14 14
University of Illinois at Urbana 20 — — — — — — — — — — —
University of Michigan 8 25 17 21 22 24 23 21 24 24 23 25
University of North Carolina 11 23 18 20 25 — — 25 — 24
































University of Pennsylvania 19 15 20 13 13 14 16 12 11 13 7 6
University of Rochester — — — 25 — — — — — — — —
University of Texas at Austin 25 — — — — — — — — — — —
University of Virginia 15 20 21 18 21 22 21 17 19 21 21 22
Vanderbilt University — — 24 — 19 25 20 18 22 20 19 20
Washington University 23 19 22 24 18 20 18 20 20 17 17 16
Yale University 3 1 1 3 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 1
Panel B: National Liberal Arts Colleges
Amherst College 4 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 1
Barnard College — 19 25 25 19 — — — — 23 — 24
Bates College — 21 21 19 23 18 21 18 22 20 19
Bowdoin College 12 9 13 4 4 6 6 6 4 8 8 7
Bryn Mawr College 11 13 5 23 11 10 15 14 9 10 9 15
Bucknell University — — — — — — — 25 — — — —
Carleton College 3 12 14 10 12 12 13 10 11 9 7 9
Centre College of Kentucky 22 — — — — — — — — — — —
Claremont McKenna College 23 18 21 13 14 16 11 — 16 15 10 15
Colgate University — 16 16 22 17 17 19 18 17 20 21 21
Colby College — 22 23 18 20 15 17 23 18 18 18 17
College of Holy Cross — — — — 23 — 25 24 — — 24 —
Colorado College 20 25 — — — — — 20 — — — 24
Connecticut College — — — — — — — — 25 — — 24
Davison College 15 20 15 10 21 18 12 8 21 11 11 11
Earlham College 16 — — — — — — — — — — —
Grinnell College 10 8 10 16 16 14 16 17 14 16 14 11
Hamilton College 25 24 23 19 25 21 22 — 23 25 22 21
Haverford College 9 10 11 21 8 9 7 6 5 6 6 5
Lafayette College — — — — — 25 — — — — — —








1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Middlebury College 17 14 12 8 9 8 8 11 7 7 12 7
Mount Holyoke College 17 17 17 17 18 19 23 12 19 19 19 19
Oberlin College 5 11 9 14 15 20 21 19 22 24 23 24
Occidental College — — — 24 24 — — — — — — —
Pomona College 6 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 8 5 5 5
Reed College 12 — — — — — — — — — — —
Smith College 14 7 7 9 10 10 9 13 10 12 15 11
St. John’s College 19 — — — — — — — — — — —
St. Olaf College 20 — — — — — — — — — — —
Swarthmore College 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 1 1 2
Trinity College — — 20 — — 24 24 22 23 21 24 23
University of the South — — — — — — — — — — — 24
Vassar College 24 15 19 10 13 13 14 16 13 17 17 17
Washington and Lee Univ. 25 23 18 15 22 22 20 15 15 13 13 11
Wellesley College 8 4 5 5 6 4 4 4 5 4 3 4
Wesleyan University 6 6 8 7 7 7 10 9 12 14 16 9
Williams College 1 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 3
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rankings is also quite stable. For example, Harvard, Princeton, and Yale are
always in the top 4, Dartmouth is never above 6 or lower than 10, and Cornell
and Brown oscillate around 10. An examination of Panel B reveals a similar
stability in composition and relative standing over time for national liberal arts
colleges (although this stability seems not as pronounced as that for the national
universities).
Table 2 presents some evidence about the empirical distribution of rankings
changes. Panel A reveals that the distribution of ranking changes for national
universities is fairly bell-shaped and centered on zero. However, the distribution
has somewhat heavy tails (kurtosis of 2.36), especially the left tail (skewness of
−0.72), and a test for normality is easily rejected at the 0.001 level. Since most
of the following tests rely on normality assumptions, this evidence implies that
inferences based on the raw data might be problematic. I address this problem
by deleting the extreme observations in the sample. To illustrate the effect of
progressive deletions, Panel A presents a set of descriptive statistics for the
sample after deleting all observations that have absolute value of changes greater
than 8 and another set of statistics after deleting all changes greater than 6. As
one might expect, the successive deletions leave the mean substantially un-
changed, reduce the standard deviation, and most importantly they substantially
reduce the skewness and kurtosis of the distribution. At the end, the specifica-
tion that deletes all observations with absolute value of changes greater than 6
leaves a sample for which normality is not rejected at the 0.10 level. This
trimmed sample is used for all statistical tests later in the study. Additional tests
reveal that the results are qualitatively similar for the less stringent trimming
and for the untrimmed sample (actual results not presented).
Panel B in Table 2 presents evidence about the empirical distribution of rank-
ings changes for national liberal arts colleges. Again, the distribution is centered
on zero and fairly symmetrical. However, the distribution has more extreme
observations for both negative and positive changes and has discontinuities for
large positive changes. The statistics confirm that the distribution is more spread
and has heavier tails than the one for the national universities as evidenced by
higher standard deviation and kurtosis. Not surprisingly, the test for normality
rejects at the 0.001 level for the untrimmed sample. To assess the effects of
deletions, I present descriptive statistics after deleting all changes with absolute
value greater than 10 and another one for values greater than 8. Again, the
successive deletions reduce the skewness and kurtosis, and the more stringent
trimming leaves a sample for which normality is not rejected at the 0.10 level.
This sample is used for all following tests. In any case, using a less stringent
trimming or no trimming has only a moderate effect on the results.
Table 3 presents regression results for the time-series predictability in changes
for USN rankings. Since there are no priors about the length of time-series







TABLE 2. Properties of the Empirical Distribution of Changes in the USN Top 25 Rankings for National
Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges
Panel A: National Universities
The empirical distribution of rankings changes
Ch −12 −11 −10 −9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
N 1 1 1 2 2 2 5 4 7 6 18 44 52 35 30 11 7 7 4 2 2
Descriptive statistics for the distribution of changes for selected trimmings of outliers
Trimming Rule N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Test for f(Ch)  Normal?
All available observations 243 −0.05 3.03 −0.72 2.36 p < 0.001
Delete all observations with −8 < Ch < 8 229 0.10 2.65 -0.14 1.25 p < 0.005
Delete all observations with −6 < Ch < 6 212 0.14 2.30 -0.02 0.68 p > 0.100
Panel B: National Liberal Arts Colleges
The empirical distribution of rankings changes
Ch −13 −12 −11 −10 −9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — 10 11 — 13 — 18
N 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 13 7 10 18 32 58 31 21 11 7 5 6 2 — 1 1 — 1 — 1
Descriptive statistics for the distribution of changes for selected trimmings of outliers
Trimming Rule N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Test for f(Ch)  Normal?
All available observations 236 −0.12 3.60 0.28 4.45 p < 0.001
Delete all observations with −10 < Ch < 10 220 −0.12 2.85 −0.16 1.31 p < 0.005
Delete all observations with −8 < Ch < 8 212 −0.11 2.67 −0.13 0.61 p > 0.100
Table 2 presents the empirical distribution of rankings changes. It also presents descriptive statistics for the distribution after successive trimmings of
outliers. Ch denotes a change of a given magnitude. N denotes the number of available observations. SD denotes standard deviation. The test for normality
of the distribution of rankings changes is the Jarque-Bera test. The p values are from chi-square scores of 77.39, 15.66, and 4.10 for national universities,
and 197.81, 16.67, and 3.88 for national liberal arts colleges (chi-square test with 2df).
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TABLE 3. Regression Results for the Relation Between Current
and Lagged Changes for the USN Top 25 Rankings of National Universities
and Liberal Arts Colleges (Regression: CurCh = b0  b1*Lag1Ch  b2 *Lag2Ch
 b3*Lag3Ch  b4 *Lag4Ch  )
Intercept Lag1Ch Lag2Ch Lag3Ch Lag4Ch Adj. R2 N
Panel A: National Universities
Coefficients 0.10 −0.20 0.04 193
(t statistics) (0.68) (−3.15)
Coefficients 0.08 −0.30 −0.23 0.12 162
(t statistics) (0.55) (−4.17) (−3.63)
Coefficients −0.01 −0.24 −0.18 0.10 0.11 133
(t statistics) (−0.07) (−3.07) (−2.36) (1.40)
Coefficients −0.05 −0.20 −0.15 0.09 0.11 0.07 104
(t statistics) (−0.30) (2.08) (−1.57) (0.96) (−1.23)
Panel B: National Liberal Arts Colleges
Coefficients −0.09 −0.26 0.06 187
(t statistics) (−0.50) (−3.56)
Coefficients 0.07 −0.38 −0.19 0.14 156
(t statistics) (0.37) (−5.17) (−2.66)
Coefficients 0.05 −0.40 −0.16 0.05 0.12 128
(t statistics) (0.28) (−4.25) (−1.88) (0.67)
Coefficients 0.12 −0.42 −0.23 0.08 −0.02 0.16 104
(t statistics) (0.55) (−4.18) (−2.22) (0.83) (−0.23)
CurCh denotes current changes, Lag1Ch denotes 1-year lagged changes, and so on. All regressions
are run after the trimming of outliers. For national universities, outliers are defined as all changes
with an absolute value greater than 6. For liberal arts colleges, outliers are defined as all changes
with an absolute value greater than 8.
changes and then proceed to include longer-lagged changes, up to four lags
before current changes. An inspection and comparison of adjusted R2, and mag-
nitude and significance of the coefficients across regressions allows one to draw
inferences about the nature and the length of the relation between current and
lagged changes. The main conclusion seems to be that for both national universi-
ties and liberal arts colleges there is a significant negative relation between
current changes and first- and second-lag changes, but no reliable evidence for
higher-order lags. For both panels, it is the second regression (the one that
includes first- and second-lagged changes only) that offers the best combination
of explanatory power and parsimony. Therefore, this study adopts the model of
current changes as a function of first- and second-lagged changes for the remain-
ing analyses.
The results for national universities in Panel A of Table 3 also reveal that the
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negative relation between current and first- and second-lagged changes is quite
strong in both statistical and commonsense terms. In statistical terms, both coef-
ficients are significant at the 0.001 level. Perhaps more importantly, the sheer
magnitude of the coefficients seems quite large at −0.30 and −0.23. Taken liter-
ally and somewhat oversimplifying the matter, these coefficients imply that
about 30 percent of a given change in the rankings reverses in the very next
ranking, and another 23 percent unravels in the 2-year ahead ranking. In other
words, the regression results suggest that there is a strong and quick reversibility
in the rankings changes for national universities. The results in Panel B are
qualitatively similar to those in Panel A. The coefficients on both first- and
second-lagged changes are negative and highly significant, with magnitudes
suggesting a pronounced reversibility in rankings changes.1
The analysis and trimmings in Table 2 indicate that the results in Table 3 are
unlikely to be due to outliers or deviations from normality. Nevertheless, I also
present some simple probabilistic evidence about the relation between current
and past changes that does not rely on any distributional assumptions. Given
the evidence of Table 3, I investigate the probability of obtaining a positive or
negative current rankings change, conditional on the signs of first- and second-
lag changes. More specifically, to test for a negative relation between current
and first-lag changes, I calculate the probability of a switch in the sign of a
current rankings change, conditional on the sign of the most recent rankings
change. Excluding observations with zero changes, if the sign of current changes
does not depend on the sign of past changes, this probability should be about
0.50. However, the empirical probability of a switch in the rankings change is
0.57 for national universities and 0.66 for liberal arts colleges. I then calculate
the probability of a switch in the sign of the current rankings change, given that
the preceding two rankings changes have the same sign. This probability is 0.77
for national universities and 0.75 for liberal arts colleges.
Summarizing, both regressions and simple nondistributional evidence indicate
a strong negative relation between current rankings changes and first- and sec-
ond-lag changes. This evidence suggests that rankings changes include a lot of
noise: They have a large transitory component, which quickly and predictably
reverses in the next two rankings.
ESTIMATING THE NOISE IN RANKINGS CHANGES
The results in Table 3 imply that rankings changes have both a permanent
and a transitory component. The permanent component captures unexpected and
permanent changes in the rankings while the transitory component is largely
meaningless noise that quickly reverts in the following two rankings. In turn,
these findings raise an intriguing issue. It seems worthwhile to obtain a quantita-
tive estimate of the relative importance of the permanent and transitory compo-
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nent in the rankings changes, which could serve as a gauge of the “fundamen-
tals” vs. “noise” proportion in the those changes.
Indeed, the results in Table 3 already suggest that noise accounts for a large
component of the rankings changes. However, it is difficult to derive precise
estimates of the relative importance of noise from the results in Table 3 because
of two considerations. First, the coefficients of the multiple regressions reflect
the incremental explanatory effect of each lagged variable on current changes,
while we are more interested in the combined explanatory effect of the lagged
variables. The combined effect is likely to be different from merely summing
the incremental effects because the two lagged variables are negatively corre-
lated as well. Second, the standard measure of combined explanatory power,
adjusted R2, is also not quite appropriate. The reason is that the R2 in the regres-
sions in Table 3 provides an estimate of variation in current changes that is due
to the reversal of past realizations of noise. However, R2 does not capture the
variation in current changes that is due to the current realizations of noise.
These current realizations of noise will also predictably reverse in the future,
and they need to be accounted for in deriving a quantitative estimate of the
proportion of permanent and transitory changes in the rankings.
I derive quantitative estimates of this proportion by using a simple model
of reversion in rankings changes and the empirical estimates of variances and
covariances in the data. The model of rankings changes is defined as follows:
RCt = pt + nt − k*nt−1 − (1 − k)*nt−2 (1)
RCt − 1 = pt−1 + nt−1 − k*nt−2 − (1 − k)*nt−3 (2)
RCt−2 = pt−2 + nt−2 − k*nt−3 − (1 − k)*nt−4 (3)
where:
RCt denotes ranking change for year t
pt denotes the permanent component of the change in the rankings for year t
n t denotes the current realization of the noise component for year t
k is a coefficient that captures what part of the current realization of the noise
component reverses in the next ranking. The entire current realization of noise
is assumed to revert within the next 2 years, with a k proportion occurring in
the very next ranking, and a (1 − k) proportion occurring in the 2-years ahead
ranking.
Equations 1 to 3 simply state that current changes in the rankings are driven
by contemporaneous changes in the permanent component of the rankings, con-
temporaneous changes in the noise component of the rankings, and a reversal
of past realizations of the noise component of the rankings. Additionally, I make
the following assumptions:
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1. The permanent changes pt are by definition unexpected, so current realiza-
tions of p are uncorrelated with past realizations of p or with current or past
realization of noise.
2. Current realizations of noise are uncorrelated with past realizations of noise.
3. The realizations RCt, pt, and nt over time are drawn from the same underlying
distributions with constant variances Var(RC), Var(p), and Var(n).
The variables of interest in this model are p, n, and k. To be more precise,
we are interested in the relative magnitude of variation of p and n because
together with k they provide an estimate of the relative proportion of permanent
changes to noise in the rankings changes. However, p, n, and k are unobservable
and have to be estimated. There are different ways to estimate these variables,
but the intuition about their estimation is straightforward. The relations between
the unobservable variables on the right-hand side of equations 1 to 3 determine
the relations between the observable left-hand side variables. Thus, one can
use the relations between the observable left-hand side variables to derive esti-
mates of the relative importance of the unobservable right-hand side variables.
Perhaps the easiest way to estimate the relative importance of the unobserv-
able variables is by using the observable variance-covariance matrix of current
and first- and second-lagged rankings changes. More specifically, one can use
equations 1 to 3 to derive a system of equations for the variance of current
rankings changes and its covariances with first- and second-lagged rankings
changes and solve it for k, Var(n), and Var(p):
Var(RC) = Var(p) + 2*(1 − k + k 2)*Var(n) (4)
Cov(RCt, RCt−1) = − k2*Var(n) (5)
Cov(RCt, RCt−2) = −(1 − k)*Var(n) (6)
This system of equations is well identified and has a unique (positive values)
solution for given Var(RC), Cov(RCt, RCt−1), and Cov(RCt, RCt−2). The empirical
estimates of Var(RC), Cov(RCt, RCt−1), and Cov(RCt, RCt−2) are calculated from
the USN samples and are given in Table 4. Panel A presents the variance-
covariance matrix for the rankings changes for national universities, and Panel B
presents the results for the liberal arts colleges. Using the estimates for national
universities, one obtains the following solution for kU, Var(n)U, and Var(p)U
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TABLE 4. Variance—Covariance Matrices for the Relation Between Current
and Lagged Changes in the USN Top 25 Rankings of National Universities
and Liberal Arts Colleges
CurCh Lag1Ch Lag2Ch





Lag2Ch −0.94 −1.36 6.04
(163) (167) (172)





Lag2Ch −0.61 −6.76 6.93
(157) (161) (167)
CurCh denotes current changes, Lag1Ch denotes 1-year lagged changes, and Lag2Ch denotes 2-
year lagged changes. The numbers without parentheses are variances and covariances for the corre-
sponding pair of variables. The numbers in parentheses are the available number of observations.
The estimate for k in this solution suggests that about 65 percent of current
realizations of noise revert in the next ranking, and the rest unravels in the 2-
years ahead ranking. It also suggests that the variation of the noise component
is considerably larger than the variation of the permanent component of the
rankings changes. Perhaps most importantly, this solution allows one to obtain
a quantitative estimate of how much of the variation in rankings changes is due
to permanent changes and how much to transitory and reversible noise. As a
convenient summary statistic, I define a rankings change noise ratio as:2
Noise ratio = (variance in changes due to noise)/(total variance in changes)
= {2*(1 − k + k2)*Var(n)}/Var(RC)
Using the estimates of kU, Var(n)U, and Var(p)U yields a noise ratio of 0.78
for national universities. In other words, the data suggest that about 78 percent
of the variation in rankings changes is due to transitory and reversible effects
rather than to permanent innovations in the rankings.
Panel B in Table 4 presents the variance-covariance matrix for current and
252 DICHEV
lagged changes for liberal arts colleges. Using the variance and covariance esti-
mates allows one to solve for the unobservable variables kLAC, Var(n)LAC, and




Further computations yield a noise ratio for liberal arts colleges of 0.69. Thus,
the estimate of noise in the rankings changes of liberal arts colleges is on the
same magnitude as that for national universities.
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE NOISE
IN RANKINGS CHANGES
The preceding sections provide strong evidence that USN rankings changes
are largely transitory and have a strong tendency to revert over the next two
rankings. This finding raises the natural question of what might be the possible
causes for this phenomenon. To address this question, the present study identi-
fies and investigates further three possible explanations. First, the reversibilities
in changes might be due to reversibilities in the rankings methodology. Second,
the reversibilities in rankings changes might be due to reversibilities in the real
performance of schools. Third, the reversibilities might be due to the fact that
USN rankings are essentially mechanical aggregations of noisy and reversible
components.
Reversibilities in the Rankings Methodology
The reversibilities in the rankings methodology explanation seem intuitive
and plausible. Holding the rankings information inputs constant, reversibilities
in the rankings methodology will produce reversibilities in rankings changes.
To illustrate, assume that USN has a fairly stable core model of how to produce
university rankings. However, suppose that USN constantly tweaks the core
model to respond to various fads. Bending the core model to accommodate the
current fad produces some changes in the rankings. After the fad subsides, the
return to the core model will produce predictable reversions of these changes.
For example, a lunge toward rewarding “research excellence” followed by a
return to “focus on teaching,” will produce predictable reversibilities in the rank-
ings. If such revisions in methodology are sufficiently prevalent and large, they
can account for the documented reversibilities in rankings.
To evaluate the relative importance of this explanation, I examine the avail-
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able methodology information. Each year, the USN rankings issue includes a
fairly elaborate description of the rankings procedures—including the compo-
nents and the subcomponents of the rankings, their relative weights, and a de-
scription of the way the components are combined in the rankings. The USN
Web site and communications with the editors also helped to confirm or clarify
some issues. As an illustration of how USN describes its rankings methodology,
the appendix provides a snapshot from USN’s Web site. As the appendix demon-
strates, the explanations are fairly straightforward and clear, and there is a good
level of available detail. Overall, it seems that the available material provides a
good understanding of the evolution of the USN rankings methodology over
time.
The main conclusion from the available information is that the changes in
methodology between 1988 and 1998 seem to be relatively incremental and
gradual, more of a fine tuning than drastic changes. For example, the component
“Financial resources” accounted for 20 percent of the rankings in 1991, 18 per-
cent in 1992, and 15 percent in 1993. “Faculty resources” accounted for 25
percent in 1991 and 1992, and 20 percent in 1993. In 1993 the “Alumni satisfac-
tion” component entered the rankings with a weight of 5 percent. Thus, the
annual changes in the rankings methodology likely produce relatively minor
changes in the rankings. More importantly, the examination of rankings method-
ologies over time revealed no pattern of repeated and predictable reversals.
Thus, it seems unlikely that reversibilities in the rankings methodology could
account for the reversibilities in rankings changes.
In fact, the examination of the methodology data leaves the impression that
ex ante the changes in methodology appear largely unpredictable. Thus, changes
in the rankings methodology produce unpredictable changes in the rankings. In
other words, methodology-induced changes in the rankings account for at least
some of the nonreversible changes in the rankings. This observation is interest-
ing because it has two important implications.
First, the evidence in the preceding section reveals that about 70 to 80 percent
of the variation in annual rankings changes is due to transitory and reversible
noise. The remaining 20 to 30 percent variation is due to nonreversible changes.
Also note that the nonreversible changes in the rankings can be due to two
reasons: nonreversible changes in the rankings methodology and real changes
in fundamental school quality. Thus, methodology-induced changes can account
for, at most, 20 to 30 percent of the variation in rankings changes.3 The compar-
ative magnitude of these two sources of variation is intriguing because critics
of the USN rankings have often brought up the problem of methodology-induced
changes as a major, or the major, problem with the rankings (e.g., Webster,
1992; Gottlieb, 1999; Karl, 1999). Critics have rightly pointed out that tweaking
the methodology produces meaningless changes in the rankings, creating excess
volatility and obvious problems in the interpretation of the rankings. However,
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this study essentially finds that reversibility in rankings changes is a more subtle
but far more dangerous source of meaningless changes in the rankings than
changes in methodology. Thus, the public debate on the merits of the rankings
can be enriched by a consideration of the importance of the reversibility in
rankings changes.
A second and related implication is that the 20 to 30 percent estimate is also
the upper limit on the proportion of changes in the rankings that can be due to
real changes in fundamental school quality. Assuming a more realistic halfway
split of the 20 to 30 percent estimate suggests that perhaps only as little as 10
percent of the variation in rankings changes is due to changes in fundamental
quality. Admittedly, this 10 percent estimate is imprecise. However, based on a
combined consideration of the preceding evidence, it seems that changes in
fundamental school quality account for only a discomfortingly low proportion
of the changes in published school rankings.
Reversibilities in Real Performance
The second explanation is that reversibilities in rankings changes could be
a natural reflection of reversibilities in real performance. For example, such
reversibilities in real performance could be due to fight-back and complacency
effects where downgraded schools work extra hard to regain their lost positions,
and upgraded schools become complacent and tend to lose their gains. However,
the fight back and complacency explanation seems somewhat strained ex ante
when one considers the speed of the reversibility in published rankings changes.
Considering the possible speed of school reactions, one would expect that fight
back and complacency effects will be felt only in medium- to long-term time
horizons, possibly 3 to 5 to even 10 years. This expectation seems inconsistent
with the preceding evidence that most of the reversion occurs in the very next
ranking, and the reversions are pretty much complete by the second year ahead.
It just seems improbable that the average university can identify a turnaround
plan, implement it, and the effects are felt and are recorded within less than a
year or two—in time for the new ranking.4
Table 5 provides some additional evidence on the importance of reversibilities
in real performance as an explanation for reversibilities in published rankings
changes by examining the properties of annual versus long-term changes. Panel
A starts with a simple comparison of the descriptive statistics for annual versus
10-year changes for national universities. Ten-year changes are the longest hori-
zon changes available for the sample period of 1988 to 1998. To preserve com-
parability between observations available for annual and 10-year changes, Panel
A presents evidence only for the subset of schools that have rankings for both
1988 and 1998. However, these data restrictions turn out to be surprisingly mild.
The number of available observations for 10-year changes in Panel A is 25,
which means that all schools that had a Top 25 ranking in 1988 were still ranked
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TABLE 5. A Comparison of Short-Term (annual) and Long-Term (10-year)
Changes in the Rankings
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Panel A: National Universities
Descriptive statistics for annual changes
243 −0.05 3.03 −12 8
Descriptive statistics for 10-year (1988 to 1998) changes2
25 −0.52 4.42 −9 9
Panel B: National Liberal Arts Colleges
Descriptive statistics for annual changes3
236 −0.12 3.60 −13 18
Descriptive statistics for 10-year (1988 to 1998) changes4
25 −0.52 5.08 −12 13
1Correlation between current and first-lag changes (p-value): −0.38 (0.001).
2Correlation between 1988–1992 and 1993–1998 long-term changes (p-value): −0.14 (0.393).
3Correlation between current and first-lag changes (p-value): −0.46 (0.001).
4Correlation between 1988-1992 and 1993-1998 long-run changes (p-value): −0.05 (0.689).
in the Top 25 in 1998! The only caveat for this remarkable fact is that USN
allowed ties in 1998 but not in 1988. Thus, there were exactly 25 schools in the
Top 25 in 1988, while a four-way split of rank 25 resulted in 28 schools being
ranked in the Top 25 in 1998. In any case, this statistic is another dramatic
illustration that membership in the Top 25 universities is quite stable over time.
An examination of the descriptive statistics in Panel A reveals two other
interesting findings. First, the standard deviation of 10-year changes (4.42) is
only marginally larger than the standard deviation of annual changes (3.03).
Second, the absolute values of the minimum and the maximum 10-year changes
(−12 and 8) are quite similar to those for extreme annual changes (−9 and 9).
Intuitively, one would expect that the standard deviation and the extremes in
10-year changes to be much larger than those for annual changes. In fact, if
rankings revisions are only triggered by new and random information, one
would expect that the standard deviation of long-term changes to be increasing
linearly in time. Thus, if there was no predictability of rankings changes, the
standard deviation of 10-year changes should be 10 times the standard deviation
of annual changes. Instead, Panel A finds that there is only a 40 percent increase
in standard deviation from annual to 10-year changes. In addition, even this 40
percent increase is probably largely accounted for by the fact that, as discussed
earlier, the long-term changes in rankings methodology are almost by definition
somewhat random and larger than the annual changes in rankings methodology.
In other words, the descriptive evidence in Panel A of Table 5 implies that
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controlling for changes in the rankings methodology, the standard deviation in
10-year changes is likely no larger than the standard deviation of annual
changes. Recall that real changes in school fundamentals are likely unexpected,
and thus the standard deviation of real changes should be increasing linearly in
time. Therefore, this evidence implies that about 90 percent of annual changes
is transitory noise that does not affect long-term rankings, and only perhaps 10
percent or so is due to real changes in the underlying fundamentals. Thus, the
descriptive evidence in Panel A of Table 5 is consistent with earlier evidence
that only a small portion of the variation in rankings changes is due to changes
in real performance.
Panel B portrays pretty much the same picture for the rankings of national
liberal arts colleges. Just like with national universities, all Top 25 schools in
1988 are in the Top 25 in 1998 as well (partly because of a six-way split of rank
24 in 1998), demonstrating that there is remarkably little long-term mobility at
top schools. The standard deviation of 10-year changes (5.08) is only marginally
larger than the standard deviation of annual changes (3.60), and the absolute
values of the 10-year extreme changes (−12 and 13) are actually lower than
those for annual changes (−13 and 18). Thus, a comparison of the descriptive
statistics in Panel B also leaves the impression that annual changes are mostly
noise that matters little for long-term changes in the rankings. It seems remark-
able that the average Top 25 school faces a 10-year variation in its rankings that
is not that different from what it has to endure in annual rankings changes.
Table 5 also offers more specific evidence about the relative importance of
fight-back effects in real performance by comparing the first-order autocorrela-
tions in annual and 5-year rankings changes. The 5-year rankings changes are
computed over years 1988 to 1992 and 1993 to 1998 to allow for the longest
possible horizons for computing a relation between current and past changes.
As one would expect from the preceding evidence, the benchmark first-order
autocorrelation in annual changes in Panel A is negative and large (−0.38), and
highly significant (p < 0.001). If medium-to-long-term fight-back and compla-
cency effects are to account for the high proportion of noise in annual rankings,
then one would also expect a significant negative correlation between 5-year
changes in the rankings. Indeed, the first-order autocorrelation in 5-year changes
is negative (−0.14), but it is not nearly significant (p = 0.393).5 The difference
is even more clear-cut for the liberal arts colleges in Panel B. The first-order
autocorrelation in annual changes is −0.46 (p < 0.001), while the autocorrelation
in 5-year changes is −0.05 (p = 0.689).
Summarizing, the evidence in Table 5 confirms earlier findings that annual
rankings changes have a large transitory component that reverses rather quickly.
In addition, there is no reliable relation between long-term changes in the rank-
ings. Thus, it seems unlikely that longer-range fight-back effects in real perfor-
mance can account for the reversibilities in annual rankings changes.
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Reversibilities in the Rankings Components
A third possible explanation for the reversibilities in rankings is that the rank-
ings contain noisy information, and the predictable reversibilities in this noise
lead to the predictable reversibilities in the rankings. A closer examination of
the rankings methodology seems to be consistent with this explanation. USN
rankings are essentially simple mechanical aggregations of several weighted
components (e.g., Academic reputation, Faculty resources, Financial resources,
etc.). Over the years, the components and the weights have evolved, but other-
wise the method of deriving the rankings remains basically the same. Since the
information in the components likely has some measurement errors or other
sources of noise, the simple aggregation of components implies that this noise
will be carried over into the rankings as well.6 By its nature, such noise will
tend to predictably reverse in the future, which implies that rankings changes
will be reversible as well.
To explore this explanation further, Table 6 offers some more specific evi-
dence about the properties of the rankings components. Panel A presents de-
scriptive statistics for the untrimmed distributions of changes for the four most
important and most stable components of the rankings for national universities.7
These four components are available for most or all years, where Academic
reputation, Faculty resources, and Financial resources typically account for 20
to 25 percent of the rankings each, and Student selectivity accounts for another
5 percent.8
The main message of Panel A is that the distributions of changes for Aca-
demic reputation, Financial resources, and Student selectivitiy are fairly similar
with comparable means, standard deviations (2.30 to 3.21), and extremes. How-
ever, the Faculty resources component has a much greater variation in changes
than any of the other components, with a standard deviation of 13.55, and much
greater extremes. This evidence implies that the variation in changes for Faculty
resources dominates the variation in changes from the other components and is
likely the chief driver of the variation in changes for the overall rankings.
Panel B in Table 6 investigates whether rankings components are reversible
in changes. Recall that earlier evidence suggests that the reversibilities in rank-
ings are unlikely to be due to reversibilities in the rankings methodology. Thus,
one would expect that there are likely reversibilities in the rankings components,
which could account for the reversibilities in rankings. Panel B investigates this
conjecture by regressing current changes in the rankings components on first-
and second-lagged changes. Since the extremes in Panel A of Table 6 suggest
that OLS estimation might be unduly influenced by outliers, for each regression
I eliminate all observations that are more than three standard deviations away
from the mean (the tenor of the results is the same for the untrimmed samples).
Overall, the evidence in Panel B demonstrates a strong negative relation be-
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TABLE 6. Properties of the Changes in Selected Components of the
USN Rankings of National Universities
Changes in Component N Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Changes in Selected Rankings Components
Academic reputation 169 −0.49 2.30 −8 5
Faculty resources 221 −0.42 13.47 −82 60
Financial resources 199 0.13 2.84 −8 11
Student selectivity 222 −0.34 3.10 −17 10
Component Intercept Lag1Ch Lag2Ch Adj. R2 N
Panel B: Regression Results for the Relation Between Current and Lagged Changes in
Selected Rankings Components (Regression: CurCh = b0 + b1*Lag1Ch + b2 *Lag2Ch + ε)
Academic reputation −0.62 −0.49 −0.21 0.18 113
(−3.13) (−5.24) (−2.20)
Faculty resources −0.18 −0.43 −0.21 0.17 149
(−0.29) (−5.67) (−3.33)
Financial resources 0.26 −0.12 0.07 0.01 136
(1.49) (−1.36) (0.89)
Student selectivity −0.36 −0.12 −0.09 0.01 157
(−1.89) (−1.60) (−1.38)
CurCh denotes current changes, Lag1Ch denotes 1-year lagged changes, and Lag2Ch denotes 2-
year lagged changes. The numbers in the table for each corresponding variable are coefficient in
the regression and t statistic (in parentheses).
Academic Faculty Financial Student
Component Reputation Resources Resources Selectivity
Panel C: Correlations Between Concurrent Changes in Selected Rankings Components
Academic reputation 1.0
Faculty resources −0.02 1.0
(0.82)
Financial resources −0.04 0.25 1.0
(0.62) (0.001)
Student selectivity 0.13 0.08 0.00 1.0
(0.09) (0.23) (0.99)
Each cell in the table contains the Pearson correlation between the two corresponding variables, and
a P-value (in parentheses).
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tween current and lagged changes for Academic reputation and Faculty re-
sources and a weak negative to no reliable relation for Financial resources and
Student selectivity. These results indicate that at least some components have a
strong reversibility in changes, which could potentially account for the revers-
ibility in overall rankings changes. It also seems telling that Faculty resources,
which is by far the most important determinant of the overall rankings, also
manifests the most pronounced reversibility in changes.
Panel C in Table 6 presents the correlations between concurrent changes in
these four components of the rankings. The premise of Panel C is that if these
components capture some common underlying fundamental like school quality
or real performance, then there should be at least a moderate positive relation
between concurrent changes in these components. However, all correlations in
Panel C except one are insignificant. The only sizable and significant correlation
is between Faculty resources and Financial resources, but this relation is also
somewhat mechanical because of a common denominator (both Faculty re-
sources and Financial resources are expressed per student). Thus, the variation
in rankings components changes seems almost entirely idiosyncratic, rather than
systematic, and possibly largely due to idiosyncratic noise. Of course, one might
argue that a very strong positive relation between components is also undesir-
able because it will imply that the components are redundant to each other as
sources of information. However, it still seems telling that there is virtually no
relation between contemporaneous changes in the components of the rankings.
Table 7 presents additional and more specific evidence about the relation
between reversibilities in changes in rankings components and overall rankings.
The table illustrates specific cases where large reversions in changes for one
component, Faculty resources, result in matching reversions for the overall rank-
ings. The Faculty resources component is a natural choice for this illustration
because it accounts for 25 percent of the overall rankings, has by far the largest
variation in changes, and exhibits a strong reversibility in changes. In view of
the preceding evidence, the tenor of the results in Table 7 is not entirely surpris-
ing. However, the consideration of specific cases brings the preceding statistical
evidence to life and helps to further discriminate between possible alternative
explanations about the reversibility in rankings changes.
The time-series of rankings of Johns Hopkins University is an interesting
extreme case that vividly illustrates the major themes in this study. The shaded
areas in Table 7 reveal two prominent dip-and-recovery periods in Faculty re-
sources, 1989–1991 and 1993–1995, where the changes in the overall rankings
clearly mirror the changes in the Faculty resources rankings. However, the really
fascinating part of this evidence is the sheer magnitude of the changes. Taken
literally, the rankings suggest that Johns Hopkins was 9 in Faculty resources in
1989, 30 in 1990, and 9 again in 1991, followed by a 37-97-15 sequence during







TABLE 7. A Comparison of the Faculty Resources Rankings and the Overall Rankings for Selected Universities
University 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Johns Hopkins Faculty Resources 9 30 9 24 37 97 15 19 14 17
University Overall Ranking 14 15 11 15 15 22 10 15 14 14
Harvard University Faculty Resources 11 2 1 4 3 3 1 11 2 2
Overall Ranking 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
University of Faculty Resources 18 21 18 20 50 13 8 14 5 6
Pennsylvania Overall Ranking 20 13 13 14 16 12 11 13 7 6
Emory University Faculty Resources — — — 17 29 21 16 20 8 12
Overall Ranking — — — 21 25 16 17 19 9 16
Washington Faculty Resources 6 46 15 29 23 30 30 9 8 9
University Overall Ranking 22 24 18 20 18 20 20 17 17 16
This table illustrates the relation between the Faculty resources component of the rankings and the overall rankings for selected national universities. The
shaded areas highlight particular instances where large and immediate reversibilities in the Faculty resources component clearly translate into matching
reversibilities in the overall rankings.
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resources of Johns Hopkins could ever manifest such a change. In fact, the
magnitude and the pattern of these changes simply defy common sense about
how true faculty resources might evolve for one of the most elite U.S. universi-
ties. The magnitude of these changes is such that it raises the possibility of
measurement or classification irregularities in the source data, or even outright
data-handling and processing errors. Additionally, note that these roller coasters
in the Faculty resources component also cause material swings in the overall
rankings. For example, the “miraculous” recovery in Faculty resources from 97
in 1994 to 15 in 1995 probably accounts for most or all of the 22-to-10 improve-
ment in overall rankings. Such a swing in overall rankings moves Johns Hopkins
from the bottom of the Top 25 to Top 10 and probably has very real effects on
applications and enrollment decisions. At the same time, this swing appears to
be mostly noise: Over the entire 10-year period Johns Hopkins has never been
ranked above 10 or below 22. It is either that 1995 was truly exceptional in
restoring Johns Hopkins’ faculty resources or more likely that the USN compo-
nent “Faculty resources” was a rather poor reflection of the underlying true
faculty resources.
The pattern of changes for Harvard University is another interesting case.
Throughout the 1990s, Harvard has always been ranked number 1 except for a
number 3 ranking in 1996. Thus, the pattern of overall changes does not reveal
any conspicuous irregularities. However, note that the dip to number 3 in 1996
is most probably related to the dip-and-recovery pattern in Faculty resources (1-
11-2 over 1995–1997). Again, it is difficult to imagine that this pattern could
occur in terms of Harvard’s true faculty resources. The more likely explanations
that come to mind are again classification, measurement, and various data-pro-
cessing irregularities. The rest of the specific cases for Table 7 largely repeat
the same theme and are presented for two reasons. First, they demonstrate that
cases like Johns Hopkins and Harvard are not that uncommon. Second, they
reveal that such pronounced reversals occur over all years and are not the result
of some year-specific regime-shifting effects (like an unidentified change in
methodology).
Summarizing the evidence about possible explanations, the reversibilities in
USN rankings are unlikely to be due to reversals in methodology or real perfor-
mance. However, the reversibilities in rankings seem to be at least partly due to
reversibilities in the underlying rankings components. The reversibilities in
rankings components are most likely due to classification, measurement, and
various types of data-handling errors, which by nature quickly reverse in the
future. On one hand, such errors are partly unavoidable. On the other hand, it
is disturbing that the variation in rankings due to such errors exceeds greatly
the variation due to real performance. The bottom line seems to be that USN
rankings changes are highly inaccurate measures of changes in school quality,
with all its related implications.
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Potential Implications for Preparers and Users of the Rankings
This study identifies strong reversibilities in USN rankings changes and offers
some possible explanations for these reversibilities. Assuming that USN and its
audience view these reversibilities as undesirable, USN could use its own propri-
etary information to investigate further and potentially take corrective measures.
An important consideration here is that USN can take successful corrective mea-
sures even with only an approximate or incomplete knowledge of the underlying
causes for the reversibility in changes. Given that the nature of the phenomenon
is known (negative autocorrelation in changes, up to second lag), USN could
use various standard statistical smoothing techniques or Bayesian updating to
correct the rankings before releasing them.
However, USN might be reluctant to implement such changes because the
elimination of noise will leave precious little “news” in the rankings. In other
words, ranking most top schools each and every year about the same might
indeed be a better reflection of their true relative academic quality. However,
that leaves little surprise to report in the annual rankings, and the absence of
surprise questions and threatens the importance of the annual editions of the
rankings. In effect, the elimination of noise could actually reduce the popularity,
the impact, and the commercial success of the rankings. Thus, it will be interest-
ing to observe whether USN implements some noise-elimination changes or
simply adheres to the status quo where most of news in the rankings is actually
reversible noise.
Note that ultimately it may not matter that much whether USN modifies its
methodology. Rankings users can also make explicit or implicit adjustments that
will remove the reversibilities in changes. Effectively, users need to greatly
discount current changes in USN rankings and view annual changes as largely
transitory noise. As a rule of thumb, long-term averages in the rankings or long-
term changes in the rankings seem to be a much better indication of the underly-
ing real levels and changes in fundamental school quality.
CONCLUSION
Changes in the USN’s annual college rankings have a strong tendency to
revert in the following two rankings. Using a simple model, this study estimates
that about 70 to 80 percent of the variation in rankings changes is due to transi-
tory and reversible noise. In other words, most of the news in the annual rank-
ings is essentially meaningless noise. After accounting for rankings changes due
to changes in methodology, it seems that perhaps as little as 10 percent of the
variation in annual rankings changes is due to real changes in school fundamen-
tals. Thus, changes in USN’s annual rankings seem to be a highly inaccurate
measure of real changes in fundamental school quality.
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APPENDIX. Undergraduate Ranking Criteria and Weights
U.S. News bases its college rankings on up to 16 different measures of academic quality
that fall into seven broad categories: academic reputation, student selectivity, faculty
resources, student retention, financial resources, alumni giving, and, for national uni-
versities and national liberal arts colleges only, graduation rate performance. The fol-
lowing table lists each quality indicator, its component subfactors, and the weight or
relative importance assigned to each category and subfactor. A brief definition of each
indicator may be found at the bottom of the table. For a more detailed explanation of
the rankings indicators and methods, please see How U.S. News Ranks Colleges.
Regional
National Universities National Regional
Universities and Regional Universities Universities
and Liberal Liberal Arts and National and Regional
Arts Colleges- Colleges- Liberal Arts Liberal Arts
Rankings Category Category Colleges- Colleges-
Category Weight Weight Subfactor Subfactor Subfactor
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National Universities National Regional
Universities and Regional Universities Universities
and Liberal Liberal Arts and National and Regional
Arts Colleges- Colleges- Liberal Arts Liberal Arts
Rankings Category Category Colleges- Colleges-
Category Weight Weight Subfactor Subfactor Subfactor
Financial 10% 10% Educational 100% 100%
resources expenditures
per student
Alumni giving 5% 5% Alumni giving 100% 100%
rate
Graduation rate 5% 0% Graduation rate 100% 0%
performance performance
Total 100% 100% — 100% 100%
Definitions of ranking criteria:
Academic reputation. The average rating of the quality of a school’s academic programs as evaluated
by officials at similar institutions. The survey was conducted in the spring of 1998.
Acceptance rate. The ratio of the number of students admitted to the number of applicants for the fall
1997 admission.
Alumni giving. Percent of undergraduate alumni of record who donated money to the college or univer-
sity, averaged over the 1996 and 1997 rates.
Class size, 1–19 students. The percentage of undergraduate classes, excluding class subsections, with
fewer than 20 students enrolled during the fall of 1997.
Class size, 50+ students. The percentage of undergraduate classes, excluding class subsections, with 50
students or more enrolled during the fall of 1997.
Expenditures per student. Total educational expenditures per full-time-equivalent student.
Faculty compensation. Average faculty pay and benefits adjusted for regional differences in cost of
living during the 1996 and 1997 academic years. Includes full-time assistant, associate, and full profes-
sors.
Faculty with Ph.D.’s. The proportion of full-time faculty members with a doctorate or the highest degree
possible in their field or specialty during the 1997 academic year.
Freshman retention rate. Percent of first-year freshmen who returned to the same college or university
the following fall, averaged over the classes entering between 1993 and 1996.
Full-time faculty. The proportion of total faculty employed on a full-time basis during the 1997 academic
year.
Graduation rate. Percent of freshmen who graduated within a 6-year period, averaged over the classes
entering between 1988 and 1991.
Graduation rate performance. The difference between the actual 6-year graduation rate for students
entering in the fall of 1991 and the rate expected from entering test scores and education expenditures.
Note: In past years, this indicator was referred to as “value added.”
High school class standing. The proportion of students enrolled for the fall 1997 academic year who
graduated in the top 10 percent (for national universities and liberal arts colleges) or 25 percent (for
regional universities and liberal arts colleges) of their high school class.
SAT/ACT scores. Average test scores on the SAT or ACT of enrolled students, converted to percentile
scores by using the distribution of all test takers.
Student/faculty ratio. The ratio of full-time-equivalent students to full-time-equivalent faculty members
during the fall of 1997, excluding faculty and students of law, medical, and other stand-alone graduate
or professional programs in which faculty teach virtually only graduate-level students. Faculty numbers
also exclude graduate teaching assistants.
Yield. The ratio of students who enroll to those admitted to the fall 1997 freshman class.
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NOTES
1. College rankings are ordinal numbers, which are bounded from above, that is, no ranking can be
higher than 1. Thus, the negative relation between current and past changes might be due to a
“ceiling effect,” where especially at the top, ranking improvements tend to be followed by rank-
ings decreases because there is little or no room for improvement while there is plenty of down-
side potential. I investigate the relative importance of this effect by recalculating the results after
the deletion the top five universities for each year. The motivation is that the ceiling effect should
be most pronounced for schools at the very top, and the negative relation between current and
past changes should be markedly weaker if it was due to the ceiling effect. However, the results
remain almost identical for this specification, which indicates that empirically the ceiling effect
is not important.
2. Of course, 1 minus the noise ratio is equal to Var(p)/Var(RC), which is the permanent change
ratio of the rankings.
3. Note that this upper limit is attained only under the rather extreme condition that there is no
relation whatsoever between changes in published rankings and real changes in fundamental
school quality.
4. Note that this argument assumes that schools fight back mostly by trying to improve real perfor-
mance. However, as noted earlier, there is evidence that schools attempt to improve their rankings
by manipulating the submission data. Such fight back data manipulations could show as immedi-
ate reversals of deteriorations in the rankings.
5. Autocorrelations in 5-year changes are corrected for the negative small sample bias (e.g., Camp-
bell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, p. 46). For first-order autocorrelations, if the computed autocorre-
lation is r, the bias-corrected estimate is given by r + (1 − r2)/(N − 1). The correction is negligible
for annual changes.
6. For example, objective measures like SAT scores are likely an imperfect measure of student
quality. Further, research in psychology indicates that people commonly use information-process-
ing heuristics, which will manifest as noise in rankings survey responses.
7. The rankings components data are voluminous and fairly heterogeneous. Thus, for parsimony, I
only present evidence about the rankings components for national universities, which is the more
important ranking. Since all previous results are similar for both national universities and national
liberal arts colleges, there is no reason to expect that the results for components will be different.
8. The components data has the following limitations. None of the components has available data
for 1988. Faculty resources and Student selectivity have complete data for all remaining years,
1989–1998. Academic reputation has no data for 1997 and 1998 because for this component
USN provided rankings before 1997 but switched to scores out of a maximum of 5 for 1997 and
1998. On examination of the data, I also found that there was a large and systematic shift in
relative Financial resources rankings between 1988 and 1989, most probably due to a changing
definition or some other methodological reason (similar to the one observed for overall rankings
between 1987 and 1988). To illustrate the effect of the shift with respect to steady-state changes,
the standard deviation of changes in Financial resources is about 11 for 1989–1998, and 2.78
for 1990–1998. Thus, to avoid the effects of regime shifts and outliers, I deleted 1989 for Finan-
cial resources.
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